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Matthew Genasci & Sarah Pray, Extracting
Accountability: Implications of the Resource
Curse for CSR Theory and Practice
Alex Kardont
Matthew Genasci and Sarah Pray argue that the best cure for the
"resource curse" in developing nations is increased transparency through
compliance with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).1
This argument is composed of two distinct claims. First, Genasci and Pray
claim that the root cause of the resource curse is the lack of government
accountability that results from reliance on resource rents rather than
popular taxation for most government revenue.2 Second, they contend that
increased transparency in the flow of funds to governments of resource-
rich developing nations from corporations involved in the extraction of
resources is the best way to increase government accountability.
3
While there is persuasive evidence that low government accountability
is at the heart of the resource curse, the link between this claim and
identifying transparency as the best solution is tenuous. Achieving
transparency may not cure the curse where civil society is not strong
enough to convert information into accountability. Since a relative lack of
taxation is behind the accountability deficit,4 a solution involving increased
taxation might be best. I propose such a solution: taxed distributions of
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funds directly from extracting corporations to citizens of resource-cursed
nations.
I. TAXATION, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND THE RESOURCE CURSE
There is ample support in the theoretical literature for the claim that
low government accountability is a central feature of the resource curse.5
This theoretical support is corroborated empirically. Evidence shows that
only the combination of resource abundance and poor government
institutions, not abundance alone, correlates with slowed economic
growth.6 Countries with better institutions when resources are extracted
will not suffer economically, 7 while countries with poorer institutions will
suffer because resource abundance will result in even worse institutions.8
Specifically, since democratic accountability correlates with the share of
government revenue arising from taxation,9 poorer governments degrade
when presented with newfound resources because the decreased role of
taxation undermines accountability. Genasci and Pray's first claim is thus
seemingly on solid ground.
There are, however, arguments against the importance of
accountability or government institutions generally in explaining the
resource curse. In a seminal paper, Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M.
Warner found any institutional changes wrought by resource abundance to
be insignificant factors in accounting for slowed growth. 10 The assertion
5. See, e.g., Nancy Birdsall & Arvind Subramanian, Saving Iraq From Its Oil, FOREIGN AFF.,
Jul. 2004, at 81 ("The most important explanation for the oil curse... has to do with the role
natural resources play in impeding the development of a society's economic and political
institutions. . . .As for the country's citizens, because they are not taxed, they have little
incentive and no effective mechanism by which to hold government accountable."); Tarek F.
Maassarani et al., Extracting Corporate Responsibility: Toward a Human Rights Impact Assessment,
40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 135, 156-57 (2007) ("EITI is based on the understanding that revenues
from oil, gas, and mining companies should serve as a powerful engine of growth in
developing countries, sustaining livelihoods and alleviating poverty. Unfortunately, a lack of
accountability and transparency almost certainly leads to corruption, conflict, and poverty.");
Martin E. Sandbu, Natural Wealth Accounts: A Proposal For Alleviating the Natural Resource
Curse, 34 WORLD DEV. 1153, 1156 (2006) (discussing the support for the view that "the
nefarious consequences of natural resource abundance work through its deteriorating effects
on the governing institutions of the country.").
6. Halvor Mehlum et al., Institutions and the Resource Curse, 116 ECON. J. 1, 1 (2006).
7. Id.. See also Birdsall & Subramanian, supra note 5, at 83-84 (citing Norway and Botswana
as two examples of strong government institutions preventing any negative growth effects
from resource abundance).
8. Xavier Sala-i-Martin & Arvind Subramanian, Addressing the Natural Resource Curse:
An Illustration from Nigeria, at 12 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9804,
2003).
9. See, e.g., Michael J. Ross, Does Taxation Lead to Representation?, 34 BRIT. J. POL. Sci. 229,
244 (2004) (demonstrating that "a rise in the price of government ... is associated with a
subsequent rise in the level of democracy").
10. Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew M. Warner, Natural Resource Abundance and Economic
[Vol. 11
2
Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, Vol. 11 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol11/iss1/5
Response: Extracting Accountability
that decreased accountability will necessarily result from increased
resources has been disparagingly labeled as "economic determinism."1
Even in countries with weak institutions, inappropriate handling of
resource rents may foster dissent that demands accountability. 12 Caution
must be taken in assuming a linkage between accountability and the source
of government revenue.13 In spite of these objections, the evidence in favor
of Genasci and Pray's first claim is substantial. The second claim is more
objectionable.
II. THE PROBLEMS WITH TRANSPARENCY
Genasci and Pray are hardly alone in believing that transparency is key
to curing the curse. EITI Chairman Peter Eigen expresses a common view
when he suggests increased transparency would lead to greater budget
accountability, improved rent allocation, poverty reduction, and eventually
greater political and social stability. 4 The World Bank apparently agrees,
as evidenced by the Bank conditioning support for the Chad-Cameroon
Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project on transparencys Scholars
identify transparency as crucial to facilitating energy infrastructure
construction in developing nations,16 and argue that the developed world
should make this transparency an objective.17 Without transparency, many
agree with Genasci and Pray that corruption, conflict, and poverty are
almost certain to follow. 8
But there are two sides to this story. Even some transparency
proponents fail to see EITI as the program to end the curse. 9 EITI focuses
on the revenue side of the ledger,20 but many feel that government
Growth, NBER WORKING PAPER 5398, NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, INc. (1995).
11. Gwenn Okruhlik, Rentier Wealth, Unruly Law, and the Rise of Opposition: The Political
Economy of Oil States, 31 COMP. POL. 295, 296 (1999).
12. Id. at 297.
13. Mick Moore, Revenues, State Formation, and the Quality of Governance in Developing
Countries, 25 INT'L POL. SCI. REv. 297, 299 (2004) (critically assessing "the assumption or
expectation that there is a causal connection between (1) the dependence of governments on
broadly levied taxes, rather than other sources of revenue, and (2) the existence of the kinds of
binding constraints on governments and institutionalized political representation that
constitute the foundations of liberal democracy").
14. Peter Eigen, Fighting Corruption in a Global Economy: Transparency Initiatives in the Oil
and Gas Industry, 29 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 327,338 (2006-2007).
15. Aude Delescluse, Chad-Cameroon: A Model Pipeline?, 5 GEO. J. INT'L AFF. 43, 44 (2004).
16. David L. Goldwyn, Extracting Transparency, 5 GEO. J. INT'L AFF. 5, 6 (2004).
17. Id. atS.
18. See, e.g., Maasarani et al., supra note 5, at 157 ("Unfortunately, a lack of accountability
and transparency almost certainly leads to corruption, conflict, and poverty.").
19. See, e.g., Goldwyn, supra note 16, at 9.
20. Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, The EITI Criteria,
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expenditures require greater oversight. 21 It is also questionable whether
EITI has the financial backing and leverage needed to achieve revenue
transparency.22 Finally, EITI relies on nations willingly participating, and
only some nations have presented themselves as willing.2 3  Even if
transparency is the answer, EITI may not promote transparency in the right
way or with the requisite collective force.
Problems with transparency run deeper than EITI. First, voluntary
transparency programs in general are fraught with incentive problems.
Genasci and Pray argue that the public support of institutional investors
worth U.S. $ 14 trillion for EITI and transparency "logically enhances
government incentives to improve transparency, as governments are keen
to cater to the demands of potential investors." 24 As many transparency
supporters accept, however, corporations have strong incentives to agree to
non-disclosure demands made by resource-rich countries,2" and
unaccountable governments have equally strong incentives not to change.
26
Genasci and Pray greatly underestimate the need to incentivize both
companies and nations if a voluntary transparency program is going to
succeed.
Some transparency supporters have not underestimated this need to
incentivize openness, particularly on the side of nations. 27 Debt relief,
financing for energy infrastructure or trade, the threat of tougher banking
regulation, and capacity-building subsidies are some incentive options
transparency advocates have considered. 28 However, governments in most
developing nations lack the administrative capacity to create, organize,
audit, and publicize a budget of resource revenues and resulting
expenditures.2 9 Multinational institutions or the extracting corporations
must provide assistance, and even the combination of an incentivized
nation and assistance from the World Bank or a corporation may not be
enough.
The principal problem with transparency-be it voluntary or
http://www.eitransparency.org/eiti/criteria (last visited May 1, 2008).
21. Goldwyn, supra note 16, at 9 ("EITI is one path to achieving transparency, but it is
deeply handicapped.").
22. Id.
23. Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, Implementing Countries,
http://www.eitransparency.org/implementingcountries (last visited June 7, 2008).
24. Genasci & Pray, supra note 1, at 54.
25. See Birdsall & Subramanian, supra note 5, at 89; see, e.g., Andreanna M. Truelove, Oil,
Diamonds, and Sunlight: Fostering Human Rights Through Transparency in Revenues from Natural
Resources, 35 GEO. J. INT'L L. 207, 220 (2003) (arguing that extracting companies "have very
strong incentives to assent to whatever payment and non-disclosure demands a host country
makes").
26. Goldwyn, supra note 16, at 8.
27. Id. at 10.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 8.
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mandated -is that it cannot cure the curse in the absence of a strong civil
society to hold the government accountable for misappropriations that are
brought to light.30 Genasci and Pray cite low government accountability as
the root cause of the curse, but transparency alone will not fill this
accountability gap if the people of a nation do not do their part. As
Genasci and Pray 3' and EITI Chairman Eigen32 acknowledge, repressive
regimes have hindered the development of civil society in many resource-
rich nations. Genasci and Pray suggest that pro-EITI countries have
publicly stated their commitment to working cooperatively with civil
society.33 This may be so, but such a commitment will be fruitless if civil
society is not prepared to do its part. Even a former World Bank employee
does not believe multinational institutions are equipped to strengthen civil
society in attempting to make transparency work,34 and corporations may
fare no better.
The aforementioned Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project exemplifies this
problem. The Chadian government was properly incentivized with aid for
infrastructure construction, the government agreed to groundbreaking
levels of domestic and foreign monitoring,35 and the World Bank was there
to help.36 Yet before the first drop of oil passed through the pipeline, the
government spent U.S. $ 4.5 million of its U.S. $ 25 million "signing bonus"
on weapons 37 to fight a civil war.38 Once the oil began flowing, the
revenues were used to buy an airplane for the President.39 Civil society
development lagged behind resource extraction in Chad,40 and resource
revenue transparency without a developed civil society failed to produce
an accountable government or remedy the curse.
30. Delescluse, supra note 15, at 48.
31. Genasci & Pray, supra note 1, at 51.
32. Eigen, supra note 14, at 343.
33. Genasci & Pray, supra note 1, at 51.
34. Delescluse, supra note 15, at 48.
35. Id. at 45.
36. World Bank, The Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project, What
is the Revenue Management Program?,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/EXTREGINI/
EXTCHADCAMPIPELINE/O,,contentMDK:20519576-menuPK:2092077pagePK:64168445-pi
PK:64168309-theSitePK:843238,00.html ("As a condition for its support for the project, the
Bank worked with the Government of Chad to help it establish an unprecedented system of
safeguards assuring that the revenues are used to reduce poverty.").
37. Id.
38. Truelove, supra note 25, at 226.
39. Birdsall & Subramanian, supra note 5, at 85.
40. Delescluse, supra note 15, at 47.
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III. NWAs: A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION
As Genasci and Pray argue, the lack of accountability central to the
curse is caused by the government deriving most of its revenues from
resource rents rather than popular taxation. Why, then, not use some form
of taxation to solve the problem? Before addressing this question, it is
helpful to consider why taxation fosters accountability.
Martin E. Sandbu convincingly argues that a primary reason taxation
engenders government accountability is a psychological phenomenon
known as the "endowment effect."41 The basic idea is that people perceive
the value of something to be greater when they are in possession of it than
when they are not. Thus, people perceive the loss of value when
something is taken from them to exceed the loss of value when an
opportunity is missed to acquire that same thing.42  The literature
demonstrates the prevalence of the endowment effect in various contexts. 43
Due to the endowment effect, people care more about money taken
from them by the government via taxation than about money the
government could have given to them but instead spent without ever
passing it through their hands." Even an instant of possession is enough to
observe a significant endowment effect. 45 In fact, even if possession never
takes place (as with income tax withholding), the contemplation of
possession followed by taking yields valuation distortions. 46 Returning to
the context of resource-rich nations, the upshot of the endowment effect is
that people will care more about how the government spends resource
revenue if it passes through their hands and is then reclaimed by the
government via taxes than if the government spends the rents without
getting people involved.
47
Based on this understanding of the role of the endowment effect in
taxation fostering accountability, Sandbu proposes a system of taxable
"Natural Wealth Accounts" (NWAs) to combat the resource curse.48 At its
core, Sandbu's system involves the governments of resource-rich nations
41. Sandbu, supra note 5, at 1159-60.
42. Id. at 1160.
43. See, e.g., Eric J. Johnson et al., Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance Decisions, 7
J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 35 (1993) (offering evidence of the existence of the endowment effect
when consumers make insurance purchases); Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990) (demonstrating
experimentally that the endowment effect persists even in market settings with opportunities
to learn).
44. Sandbu, supra note 5, at 1154.
45. Daniel Kahneman et al., The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and the Status Quo Bias, 5
J, ECON. PERSP. 193, 194-97 (1991).
46. Sandbu, supra note 5, at 1157.
47. Id. at 1160.
48. Id. at 1156-57.
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distributing all resource rents evenly to citizens, and then reclaiming a
percentage via taxation.49 Even in a nation without a developed civil
society, individuals in such a system will care more about how the
government is spending resource money. Rather than relying on
transparency to increase demands for accountability even in nations
without developed civil societies, Sandbu's NWAs appeal to a fundamental
feature of the human psyche to fill the accountability gap. For this reason,
NWAs are a promising step toward a real cure for the curse.
One problem with NWAs is that governments of resource-rich nations
presumably must agree to participate. As Sandbu acknowledges,
governments currently capturing almost all resource rents without having
to answer to the people may have no motivation to agree to NWAs.50 He
suggests that NWAs could come to fruition after significant upheavals or
revolutions, before governments have experienced the perks of
exploitation, when populist leaders ascend, or by buying off entrenched
exploiters with efficiency gains made by ending the curse's hampering of
economic growth.5' The first three possibilities fall far short of making
NWAs a universal solution, and while the fourth offers the promise of
universality, it seems far-fetched and would require either massive
financial outlays by intervening institutions or the willingness of
entrenched parties to wait until efficiency gains are realized to receive
buyouts. Sandbu's NWA proposal offers a brilliant basic mechanism for
curing the curse, but it fails to offer a realistic solution because it identifies
the wrong entities (governments of resource-rich nations) to set the
mechanism in motion.
IV. A SOLUTION: TAXED CORPORATE DIRECT DISTRIBUTIONS
Sandbu is right that some resource rents should be distributed to
people and partly reclaimed by the government via taxation, but the initial
distributors should be extracting corporations, not governments. This
alteration to Sandbu's proposal reduces incentive problems. As Genasci
and Pray discuss, extracting corporations already execute a number of
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) programs in resource-rich nations.52
Some corporations likely would willingly take money spent on these
programs and instead distribute it directly to the people to later be taxed
by the government, and governments should happily accept this newfound
revenue. A system in which extracting corporations allocate CSR money to
direct distribution to people with the understanding that governments will
49. Id. at 1157.
50. Id. at 1164.
51. Id. at 1163-64.
52. Genasci & Pray, supra note 1, at 54.
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tax these distributions at their discretion capitalizes on the endowment
effect mechanism proposed by Sandbu, but repackages the mechanism so
the parties conducting the initial distributions should be more inclined to
do so. Such a system of taxed corporate direct distribution seems more
likely than transparency to actually cure the resource curse.
Sandbu identifies advantages and disadvantages of his proposal. Some
advantages and disadvantages are preserved when corporations conduct
the distributions, while others are erased. One advantage Sandbu
highlights is that allowing governments to set the tax on NWAs might
generate political discussion and pressure governments to justify higher
rates by explaining how revenue will be spent.5 3 With taxed corporate
direct distribution, this advantage would be preserved since the tax rate
would still be at the government's discretion. Another advantage of
NWAs is that they could not do much harm even if they failed to cure the
curse. Some revenues might still be redistributed from ill-spending
governments to people, and certainly no additional money would end up
in governmental hands.54 With corporations doing the distributing, this
advantage would be erased, as some corporations would be taking money
previously used productively and handing it to unaccountable
governments indirectly via taxation.
An obvious concern for Sandbu's program is its logistical difficulty,55
and this is also a concern to some extent with taxed corporate direct
distribution. That being said, with corporate agents responsible for
administering the program, the likelihood of corruption in implementation
should decrease. Given the immediacy with which the endowment effect
takes root, corporate agents could even implement the program in the least
developed nations by setting up tents and having people pick up their
distributions at one table and pay their taxes at the next. This should be no
more difficult than mass vaccination, a project that has been tremendously
successful in many developing nations.56 Finally, a concern for Sandbu's
plan erased by involving corporations is the risk that governments will be
pressured to keep the tax so low that not enough money will be available
for public works even if governments want to spend it on the public.57 This
is not a concern with taxed corporate direct distribution because a large
percentage of resource rents are never distributed. If governments want to
spend on development, enough money will be available.
While these advantages and disadvantages are important, it is worth
restating that the main difference between NWAs and taxed corporate
direct distribution is that incentives are there to put one in place and not
53. Sandbu, supra note 5, at 1163.
54. Id. at 1165.
55. Id. at 1164.
56. Birdsall & Subramanian, supra note 5, at 87.
57. Sandbu, supra note 5, at 1165-66.
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the other. Therefore, taxed corporate direct distribution is a feasible cure
for the resource curse; NWAs are not. Sandbu's proposal, however, is still
a significant positive step away from transparency plans like EITI.
Transparency is not enough to produce the accountability needed to end
the resource curse. Something is needed to make people, even in
undeveloped civil societies, care how governments spend their money.
That something is taxation, and NWAs and taxed corporate direct
distribution succeed where transparency initiatives fail by recognizing this
fact.
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